When the Iranian students occupied the Embassy, they also had the chance to seize all the documents existing in the buildings.
So, unlike what happened in Saigon or in other capitals (including, probably, Tehran itself a few months earlier during the climax of the anti-Pahlavi revolution) where the Embassy staff had enough time to select and destroy all sensitive materials, the November 4th takeover was so unexpected that everything was left in the hands of the intruders.
The Iranian government soon decided to publish the documents found and began to edit a series of books called in Persian "Asnad-e lane-ye jasus,"
i.e., "Documents of the nest of spies."
By 1983 some 33 of them were issued, mostly dealing with Iran and Iranian questions.l But two of them, nos. 29 and 30 2 (~ereafter referred to as# 1 & # 2), were dedicated to Afghanistan.
As those two volumes are not easily found, I have been asked to prepare a synopsis and some comments. I shall indicate the distinctive features of the two volumes and how I have summarized them. First, however, it may be useful to introduce a few remarks about the documents themselves.
All of the documents are copies of telex messages ·sent to or from Kabul and also sent for information purposes to other US embassies, including Tehran where they were filed and then discovered by the Iranian students.
Only a few documents originated from Tehran itself, such as a confidential telegram (#8 in our collection), or the draft of a letter sent by Charles W. Naas, charge d'affaires a.i., to the Iranian Deputy Prime Minister Amir Eltezam (#20, see also #21 and #22).
Documents #116-130 deserve special mention as they are reproduced in the volumes after all the little strips into which thev had been cut had been put back together again [see pp. 21 & 28] .
In spite ~f the careful reconstruction work, they remain hardly readable without comparing them with the Persian translation in the books.) These papers are worthy of notice because they all originated from CIA offices and refer to information collected through secret intelligence and to demonstrations of Afghans against the DRA government held in New Delhi on September 28, 1979, which "were funded by New Delhi Station (of the CIA) and organized at Station behest. 11 3
Apart from this special group, to which must be added #1 (a biography of Daud prepared by the Central Reference Service of the CIA in 1973), the general contents of the messages vary from normal intelligence (sometimes bordering on gossip harvesting) caught during official meetings or evening parties, to bureaucratic briefings regarding formal contacts and conversatio~s by US officials with Afghan political leaders (both government and opposition) and with Soviet, East and West European, Indian, Chinese, etc., staff members, to news concerning the internal situation in the countrY, to biographies and evaluations of top~~~. dignitaries.
The period covered runs from January 30, 1978 to November 2, 1979 (two days before the embassy occupation).
Only the first one (the above-mentioned biography of Daud) was prepared before; only 11 documents were dated from 1978 (two could not be chronologically identified, i.e., #30b and #126).
I am not certain that all of the documents actually found by the students have been reproduced. 4 Frankly, I think a choice has been made. For instance, no document (except for a few lines in #116) deals with the murder of Ambassador Dubs on February 14 or with the Herat uprising on March 12, 1979, two important events which occurred during the period covered.
The latter deficiency, in particular, could be very meaningful as some have suggested that the Iranian Islamic Government was directly involved in the rebellion.
At any rate, through the Reference Telexes often mentioned in the documents, it appears without doubt that many other messages concerning Afghanistan must have reached Tehran. Unfortunately there is no trace of them in the volumes. In spite of this, however, the importance of the volumes remains two-fold: they contain new and (as far as I know) not yet exploited information about a crucial period of recent Afghan history, information deriving, moreover, from well-identified and acknowledged sources; and they allow us a close look into the international diplomatic world, into the activities, objectives, relationships, methods, etc., of Kabul, Washington, Tehran, Moscow, Peking and many other foreign affairs offices, both East and West, North and South.
Such a glance behind the curtain is rarely possible because diplomatic documents become accessible (and not always in their actual fullness) to the public only when a long period of time has elapsed from the time they were written.
And when sometimes it happens that some secret or confidential news is disclosed on-the-spot to the mass media by "unidentified diplomatic sources," its real worth very often approaches zero, as the Afghanistan Forum readers know! In the case of Asnad-e lane-ye jasus, however, we have the very feelings and proofs of how things happened behind the scene a few years ago, a very useful reminder in our troubled days when, once again, propaganda threatens to wipe out reality.
The two volumes on Afghanistan, #29 and 30 of the Asnad-e lane-ye jasus, were published by the Daneshjuyan-e mosalman-e peircv -e Khatt-e Emam. The books have no bibliographical data; there is only an indication (in Persian) of three places in Tehran where they can be purchased.
Vol.l has 232 numbered pages of English text and 247 numbered pages of Persian translation, plus a blank page in the middle and 4 unnumbered pages at the beginning of the Persian section containing the title, the addresses of the three bookshops, the basmala written as a tughra and a set of general explanations recalling to Iranian readers how all the documents in the ~eries show the actions and deeds of the Sheitan-e bozorg, the Big Devil.
Volume 2 has 163 numbered pages of English text and 229 of Persian plus two blank pages in the middle and again four pages at the beginning of the Persian section identical to Volum~ 1 but for the lack of the set of explanations.
In the copies I have used, Volume 2 also has two unnumbered pages preceding the English section; the first one with the basmala in Arabic and in English, the second one with the following annotation:
"Telegrams no. Tehran 452, Tehran 4791, Tehran 6160, and Tehran 0025 were the last copies of their original texts, and, thus, very dull in color.
Therefore their printing and photographing in books were nor favorably possible.
For this reason, the abovementioned documents were re-typed." 
1.
We agl"'ee with the bl"'oad outlines of your assessment of the genel"'al dil"'ection of de~elopments in Afghanistan and the uncertains pl"'ospects for a return to close o.S.-Afghan !"'elations.
Nevel Bown-playing of Afghan reTugees, restrained re thor i c, and appears to see such a pol i C>' as;. in its interest.
5.
One option would be for us to phase out our activities in Afahanistan, but we believe this would be very unsettling to Afcihanistan s neiqhbors and incompatible with their policies.
The DRA has not asked us to pack our bags and leave but on the cc,n trary has accepted c,ur pol icy of maintaining our interests and presence. Closing out our e ff c,r· ts i n Af oh an i =·tar, wc,u l d l i Ke l y be seen as an abd i cat i c,n of our responiabil ity and would accomplish for the Soviets one of theil"' primary objectivesi namely to reduce further U.S. 
